 Part 8: England in the 20th Century
John Major & Tony Blair
John Major then took over the reigns of the Conservative Party as Prime Minister. He was committed to keeping "Thatcherism" alive. The unions were not going to regain their former powers, despite public sentiment in favor of the miners and as debatable as the benefits of privatization had proved, there was no going back to the old days of nationalized industries (and council houses, which had been offered for sale to private owners).
What must not be overlooked in the polices of "Thatcherism" was the influence upon intellectuals and government policymakers alike of "The Road to Serfdom" by F.A. Hayek (first published in 1944). On Hayek's 90th birthday, Mrs. Thatcher wrote that none of what her government had achieved would have been possible without the values and beliefs "that set us on the right road and provide the right sense of direction." As a result of reading the book, Anthony Fisher founded the Institute of Economic Affairs in London which was to be the most important source of free-market ideas in Britain. By the mid-90's, there was very little to divide the Labour and Conservative parties on the central principles of economic management.
When Major was first elected, Britain was still saying "No" to socialism. By the general election of 1992, leading magazines (particularly in the US) wrote of the death of the Labour Party eventhough it had abandoned its policy of nuclear disarmament, forgotten that it had preached in favor of public ownership of the means of production and exchange, embraced the European community and purged from within the unrepresentative labor bosses. Its motto "It's Time for a Change" seemed to appeal to most Britons; not a single poll showed the Conservatives winning. But once again, the desire for continuity overrode the desire for change, John Major was returned to power.
Yet as early as 1993, the winds of change were blowing strong. Many Conservative M.P.'s were in open rebellion over Europe. They were told to support Major's European policy or bring down the government. The warm afterglow of the Gulf War had dissipated rapidly and continuing economic problems and uncertain leadership ate away Major's popularity.
Leading Tories wanted to scuttle any deals Britain had made at Maastricht; they feared that British industry would be subject to European regulations in working conditions and labor relations. Hundreds of Tory candidates were in open rebellion over Major's fence straddling on Europe; the Euro-skeptics determined to sabotage their leader. Why should they force Britain to enter a stagnant Europe? In addition, continuing revelations in the daily newspapers about scandals involving leading Tories doomed Mr. Major.
Despite the fact that the economy was recovering and inflation was at a 30-year low, the sale of tens of thousands of public housing (at bargain prices), perhaps the greatest gift of wealth to the working class in British history, putting the country far ahead of the US and Europe in the percentage of housing units owner-occupied, and despite the highest growth rate and the lowest unemployment in Europe, Labour won a landslide victory in 1997. Tony Blair was thus able to inherit an economy free from the dreaded "British disease" (militant trade unions, over-regulation, vacillating government policies and a foolish disdain toward enterpreneurship).
The election took place only two years after Labour had rid itself of the clause in its constitution that called for the "common ownership of production, distribution and exchange." It was particularly anxious to keep the billions of dollars that had been invested annually in the UK by the US, Japan, Korea and others during the 16 years of Conservative rule. The new brand of socialism was hardly distinguishable from that of Mrs. Thatcher but the move of Labour to the center was expedited by the popularity of its leaders.
The question of just how much should Britain integrate itself into Europe remained a thorny issue with the new government. It was now joined by a much more ancient problem: that of devolution with the British Isles, with powerful voices being raised in Scotland and Wales for more self-government, and the seemingly insoluble problem of Northern Ireland casting a deep shadow over the entire so-called United Kingdom.
On March 1, 1979 (St. David's Day) the people of Wales voted overwhelmingly against devolution. The reasons were many (they are discussed in full in my "Brief History of Wales" and "The Referendum of 1979." Too many feared changes in the statues quo; the work of the anti-devolutionists, led by such influential Welsh M.P.'s as Neil Kinnock (with his eyes on the Prime Minister's job) was done only too well. But in 1997 a new referendum was held in which, by a small majority, the people of Wales chose an Assembly of their own, despite heavily financed campaigns against it. This time, they had been supported by the Labour Party, led by Tony Blair.
Scotland, meanwhile, voted overwhelmingly in favor of its own Assembly. The reasons are given at length in my "Brief History of Scotland," but are also summarized below:
Though very much a minority party, and still suffering from the stigma attached to the very idea of nationalism during war years, (the Scottish National Party) SNP had begun to build its organizational skills and work on political strategy; its share of the vote steadily grew. This was also a period of intense activity in Wales by members of Plaid Cymru, the Party of Wales, and by the fervent and some say overzealous and destructive activities of the Welsh Language Society Cymdeithas yr Iaith Cymraeg. In any case, discontent in both areas of Britain led to a feverish proliferation of committees soon at work in Westminster looking at further measures of devolution for Scotland and Wales.
The government published its proposals for a devolved Scottish assembly in November 1975. It would have no revenue raising powers and sovereignty would be retained in Westminster. Though prospects for passage looked good, the wide range of competing priorities for government attention took away the time needed for the Callaghan government to devote to the issue. Labour, fearing loss of support in Scotland to the SNP, was also still deeply divided on the question and the extent of devolution. The government's program was bound to fail: the Bill was headed for defeat.
Eighteen years later, the results were reversed. On September 11, 1997, four days after the trauma of Lady Diana's funeral, the referendum resulted in the decision to give back a Parliament to Scotland by a 3-1 margin. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, whose Labour Party had actively campaigned for passage of the devolution bill, called the results a step in the process of "modernizing Britain." Hollywood movie star, Scotsman Sean Connery (who did not appear in "Braveheart") campaigned hard and contributed a great deal of cash to the campaign, invoking the 1370 Declaration of Arbroath, "It is not for glory, riches or honours we fight, but only for liberty, which no good man loses but with his life."
The decision gives Scotland an Assembly with tax-levying powers, unlike the much weaker "talking-shop" that the Welsh are going to be saddled with as the result of their own (barely) successful referendum. The Scots will be given the broad authority to legislate in a host of sectors, but Westminster has the right to "reserve" or "withhold" many powers (constitutional matters, foreign policy, defense, and national security, border controls, monetary and fiscal matters, common markets for goods and services, employment law, and social security).
For the people of Wales and Scotland (and no less, the people of England), the decision to approve the Labour Government's plans for separate assemblies, may prove to be one of the most important ones in their long histories. In the councils of Europe, three voices will be heard instead of one: three equal voices, sharing a unique British heritage, but each proud of its own distinctiveness as cultural and political units. Westminster must have breathed a sigh of relief that the problems of devolution for Wales and Scotland were settled so amicably. Would the Irish question follow the same road? The problem of Europe remained for Tony Blair; in addition, there was the age-old question of what to do about the House of Lords.
In many ways, the Upper Chamber had become an anachronism. The very idea of non-elected, hereditary legislators seemed ridiculous in a country that prided itself on its democratic institutions. The old arguments about the need for a second chamber to act as a brake on any impetuousness showed by the government of the day had long since disappeared. Time and time again the Lords had obstructed legislation that would have surely benefited the nation. Their defense of ancient privilege had often blinded them to the realities of British political life since the time of Oliver Cromwell. Their record on Ireland was appalling, with their obstruction of Home Rule Bills, but it could be matched by many other areas in which they had excelled in their obstinacy.
Leaving aside century after century of attacks on the privileges (and power) enjoyed by the Lords, it was the budget of Lloyd George in 1909 that really stirred up the pot. The landed aristocracy saw his attempts to tax the rich as the beginning of the end of all rights of property. When the Lords rejected his bill, Lloyd George threatened to swamp them with five hundred new peers. Yet all attempts at reform eventually died down lacking a concerted opinion as to what kind of second chamber the country should support. The Parliament Bill of 1911 was thus a weak compromise: all the hereditary peers and bishops would stay in the House, but their powers of delay would be reduced to two years: it continued to remain a powerful revising chamber.
The advent of the First World War postponed the move to exclude hereditary peers from the Upper House. A conference held in 1917, however, faced the old difficulty of "the paralysing perplexity of so many alternatives." The Commons also feared that an elected upper chamber would offer a serious challenge to its own powers. In 1922, Lloyd George became notorious for selling lordships to the highest bidder; and the old aristocracy found itself rapidly outnumbered by the new captains of industry and leading financiers on the benches of the chamber. The newcomers proved just as anxious to preserve their newly-gained privileges as their hereditary colleagues.
Another crisis occurred in 1960 when Antony Edgwood Benn, a promising and ambitious Labour M.P. was duly elevated to the peerage upon the death of his father (who had been appointed as a Labour peer only twenty years before). As a peer, the younger Benn was refused admission to the Hose of Commons when he came to take his usual seat. A private bill, to allow him to resign his peerage, was defeated. It took four years of contentious debate to settle the matter, but it was evident that the House of Lords needed some drastic changes. The days of complacency were over.
In 1967, the Labour Party announced its plans to reduce the powers of the Lords and to eliminate its hereditary basis. Once again, however, it was willing to compromise in the uncertainly of what was to replace the second chamber. Many Labour M.P.'s wished to abolish the Upper House altogether, but a compromise was reached: only minor changes were effected. In the late 1990's, the government of Tony Blair and is centrist Labour Party, is still grappling with the problem of the Lords, a problem that perhaps exemplifies the struggle of Britain to adjust itself to the modern world.
There is nothing in the nation's proud past that would prevent a satisfactory solution to the problem of the privileges enjoyed by the House of Lords. While England my no longer Rule the waves, it is perfectly capable of putting its own house in order, as Wales and Scotland have shown. The past two thousand years have shown a resilient people, proud and independent; a people who will continue to give so much to the world, in art, literature, politics, science and technology, exploration, social welfare and sport; but above all, in the difficult art of compromise.
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